• n December 1991, the leaders of the member states of the European Unioñ met in Maastricht, the Netherlands, to conclude the negotiations on a Treaty on European Union. The Maastricht Treaty as it is commonly known, encompasses a wide range of issues, from foreign affairs and security policy to citizenship, health and tourism. Primarily, however, the Maastricht Treaty is known for formalizing the intentions of the member states of the European Union to create an economic and monetary union (EMU) by the end of this century. The main features of EMU are the creation of a single monetary policymaking body and a single currency for the European Union.
While EMU seemed certain in December 1991, within a year the outlook had turned much bleaker. In a referendum injune 1992, Danish voters rejected the treaty This was followed by a series of exchange rate crises affecting the European Union in 1992 and 1993. Despite these setbacks, the Maastricht Treaty was ultimately approved by all member states (a second referendum passed in Denmark in 1993) and the treaty entered into force on November 1. 1993. In accordance with the treaty the European Union is laying the groundwork for monetary union: creating the institutions and studying the technical details necessary to meld as many as 14 independent monetary policymaking bodies into one cohesive systetn) Furthermore, to make themselves eligible for entry into EMU, countries are undertaking policies aimed at achieving economic convergence across the European Union.
This economic conversion is seen as an integral part of the process toward monetary union. Indeed, the Maastricht Treaty is based on the idea that economic convergence is a prerequisite for monetary union. The treaty creates a series of criteria which countries mnst meet to join the monetary union. These criteria are designed to ensure that potential entrants share a commitment to that union.
Much has been written critiquing the usefulness of economic convergence prior to monetary union.2 Some papers, such as Dc Grauwe (1994) , focus on whether the convergence indicators detailed in the treaty are the proper indicators to ensure a well-functioning monetary union. This article does not enter this discussion; rather, given the criteria established by the Maastricht Treaty, it assesses the progress of the members of the European Union in meeting these criteria. After illustrating the lack of progress of the EU in tneeting them, I consider the two main alternatives available to the member states that hope to achieve monetary union in the near future. One is to allow latitude in the application of the convergence criteria and the other is to view the starting date for monetary union as flexible.
BACKGROUND
Serious discussion in Europe of a move to monetary union began in 1988 with the decision of the European Council to create a Committee for the Study of Economic and Monetary Union. This committee was chaired hyJacc 1 ues Delors, the president of the European Commission,' The Delors Coanmittee, as it was commonly known, was given a mandate to examine the issue of EMU and to develop a program aimed at its inuplementation. In 1989, the committee issued a report stating:
"Economic and monetary union in Europe would imply complete freedom of movement for persons. goods, services and capital, as well as irrevocably fixed exchange rates between national currencies and Belgium nod l1100rrb000g aloud 9 operate in u monetary 30(00. See, for example, Do Groowe (1992) and Potter (19931.°S ee tie shaded insert, "Institutions of the European Unior' on page 2 for on erpionofon of the institutonol structure of the lampoon Union.
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INSTITUTIONS OF THE EUROPEAN UNION
The European Commessnon is the executixe branch of the European Union government. In the plan suggested by the Delors Report, and incorporated in the Maastricht Treaty EMU was to be achieved in three stages. Broadly speaking, stage one would emphasize economic convergence and stage two would emphasize institutional convergence. The final steps to full EMU would occur during stage three.
During stage one, which began in July 1990, the member countries of the European Union were to achieve greater convergence in economic performance through increased policy coordination. Stage one was also to be characterized by the completion of the single internal market and removal of all finally a single currency This, in turn, would imply a common monetary policy and require a high degree of compatibility of economic policies and consistency in a number of other policy areas, particularly the fiscal field. These policies should be geared to price stability balanced growth, converging standards of living, high eonployment and external equilibrium" (Committee for the Study of Economic and Monetary Union, 1989, p. 17 The most important role of the EMI is to ensure that the technical barriers to EMU are removed prior to the start of stage three. These barriers include cross-country differences in the conduct of monetary policy financial regulations, payments systems and currencies. The EMI is studying issues related to the conduct of monetary policy For example, should the future European Central Bank target the money supply as the German Bundeshank does, or should it target inflation, as the Bank of England does? Another issue being studied by the EMI is the design and implementation of the single currency system. This is a politically volatile issue because each country has an interest in having the new currency resemble its own, Stage three will mark the final transition to a full-fledged monetary union. At the start of stage three, exchange rates between mennber countries will be permanently fixed. The governments of the member countries of the monetary union, acting in consultation with the European Commission and the European Central Bank, will determine the exchange rates at which currencies are to be fixed. The determination of these fixed exchange rates requires the unanimous consent of the member states, As the final step to EMU, individual currencies will be replaced with a common currency Monetary policy decisions will he made by the independent, supranational European Central Bank, According to the Maastricht Treaty stage three must start byJanuary 1, 1999, The exact starting date will be determined as follows. By December 1996, an inter-governmental conference comprised of the leaders of the European Union countries must meet to determine if EMU is ready to commence. Prior to this meeting, the European Commission and the EMI are to issue reports detailing the progress made by each country in meeting the convergence criteria. These reports will be sent to the Council of Ministers, The Council of Ministers will use these reports to determine:
• whether each member state fulfills the necessary conditions for the adoption of a single currency; and
• whether a majority of the member states fulfill the necessary conditions for the adoption of a single currency (Treaty on European Union, Article 109j.2).
The decisions of the Council of Ministers will be made on the basis of a "qualified" majority vote. If no date for the start of monetary union has been set by the end of 1997, the treaty obligates the leaders of the European Union countries to meet by July 1, 1998, to determine, based on the same procedure outlined above, which metnher states fulfill the conditions for monetary union. These states are then to enter the third stage on January 1, 1999. For monetary' union to begin prior to 1999, a majority of countries nnust meet the criteria established by the Maastricht Treaty However, in 1999, according to the treaty EMU will commence for those countries (however few) that meet the entry conditions.
The countries that do not uneet the entry conditions and are excluded from EMU will, according to the Treaty be referred to as "member states with a derogation" (Treaty on European Union, Article 109k.2). This exclusion, however, need not be permanent. At least once every two years, following the guidelines outlined above, the European Council will decide by qualified majority which unember states with a derogation have fulfilled the entry criteria and admit them to the ononetary union,
CONVE'RGINCE CRIT.EAJ.A
As noted above, entry into EMU is dependent upon the fulfillment of what the Maastricht Treaty calls "necessary conditions." What are these conditions? First, to facilitate the common monetary policy each member must guarantee the independence of its central bank and pass national legislation in accordance with the protocol establishing the European Central Bank. Second, in making their reports on the progress of countries in meeting the necessary conditions, the European Comnussion and the EMI are to consider the progress made in developing a comunon currency, "the results of the integration of markets, the situation and development of the balances of payments ou account and an examination of the development of unit labour costs and other price indices" (Treaty on European Undon, Article 109j.1).
Most attention, however, has been focused on the conditions that the Maastricht Treaty says are designed to ensure "the achievement of a high degree of sustainable convergence" (Treaty on European Union, Article 109j.1). Convergence must he achieved in exchange rates, inflation rates, long-term interest rates and government finances, The treaty and two separate protocols detail these convergence criteria as follows: 6
• • The average inflation rate for any member state during the year prior to the examination by the European Commission must have been no more than 1.5 percentage points above the average rate of inflation in the three best-performing countries during this same period.
• The long-term interest rate (on government bonds or comparable securities) of any member state during the year prior to the examination by the European Comtnission must have been no more than 2 percentage points above the average long-term interest rate of the three countries with the lowest inflation rates during this same period.
• The governnnent budget deficit of any member state may not exceed 3 percent of that country's GDP at the time of the examination.
• The government debt of any member state may not exceed 60 percent of the country's GDP at the time of the examination. 7 Table 1 sunnanarizes the performance of each current EU member state in fulfilling the convergence criteria during the years 1990-94, As this table shows, the path toward convergence has not been smooth. On the basis of these five criteria, more countries met tine eligibility requirement in 1990, the year before the treaty was concluded, than in any subsequent year. Denunark, France, Gernnany and Luxennbourg met all five convergence criteria in 1990,~The number of countries fulfilling the criteria declined in each following year, reaching a low of zero in 1993, In 1994, the performance of the meunhers of the European Union improved slightly with Germany and Luxembourg meeting all five criteria.
As Table 2 ). The exchange rate crises ended in August 1993 with the expansion of the bilateral bands from ±2,25percent to~15 percenl. for all pairs of currencies with the exception of the Dutch krona/Deutsche unark, The consensus within the European Union is that these wider hands have reduced currency speculation and thus have lessened the prospects for exchange rate crises within the ERM. Thus, no return to the narrow' tnargins is likely The maintenance of the expanded margins presents no problem for the fulfillment of the convergence criteria as long as the European Commission and the European Council agree that the treaty's reference 1.0 "normal fluctuating margins" means margins of ±15 percent.
In March 1995, the currencies within the ERM again experienced sharp fluctuations.
The movement in the exchange markets away from dollars and into Deutsche marks caused problems for weaker currencies within the ERM. As a result of this turbulence, the escudo and the peseta were both devalued. In the absence of any further devaluations, only eight of the 15 member countries of the European Union would meet the exchange 'As discussed i n the Protocol an the Excessive Deficit Procedure, the deficit and debt natos are bused ant generol gaoernnieat budgets, that i s, the ceutrul ganernment, regional or local gouernments nod social secuity futtds. Commercial opera' tions of the public sector are excluded. The deficit is defined as net borrowing by the ganaramunt.
Net banrawirg eucltdas any pot/ut of the deficit that is used for "the ocqtisitian of loans on other llama' ciai ussens by the govummunt. 
Inflation Criterion
Comparing 1990 to 1994, the performance of the EU countries with regard to the inflation criterion has improved. As shown in Table 3 , seven of the present 15 EU countries met the inflation criterion in 1990. This number fell to five in 1993, but rebounded strongly with 11 countries meeting the criterion in 1994. Greece, Italy Portugal and Spain were the countries with inflation rates exceeding the criterion in 1994. Although these four countries have not men the criterion in any year, each country has made progress in lowering its inflation rate over the period in question.
The economic recovery currently under way in Europe is expected to lead to a slight increase in inflation in anost member cotmntries by 1996. Because the criterion is based on the performance of the three countries with the lowest inflation, a general increase in the rate of inflation will not affect the overall performance of countries. As shown in Table 3 , the increase in the inflation forecast for 1996 is not expected to reduce the number of countries satisfying the inflation criterion. Moreover, the inflation performance of the countries not currently meeting the criterion is expected to improve over the next two years.
Interest Rate Cr.iterion
The interest rate criterion has been the one thar countries have usually found easiest to meet. Furthermore, the member countries showed stead)' icnproveanent over the period 1990-94. In 1990, as shown in Table  4 , nine countries had long-term interest rates within the hunit set forth in the Maastricht Treaty This number rose to lOin 1991 and increased to II in 1993. In 1994, however, the number of countries meeting the interest rate criterion slipped back to 10. In 1994, Greece, Italy Portugal, Spain and Sweden did not meet this criterion. The formner four have never met the criterion.
Public Finance Criteria
The two public finance criteria have caused the biggest problems for countries in their quest to join the EMU. In 1990, nine of the current 15 EU countries met the deficit criterion while only three met, it in did in 1994. Much of this decline can be attributed to the expansionary nature of fiscal policies in reaction to the recession of the early 1990s, from which Europe is just beginning to recover. The effect of the recession on public finances can be seen by considering the exacuple of Finland, Output growth in Finland fell from 5.7 percent in 1989 to -7.1 percent in 1991. Consequently Finlandts government budget balance declined from 5.4 percent of GDP in 1990 to a low of -7.8 percent in 1993. The government budget deficit shrank in 1994 as its economy moved out of recession.
The economic recovery currently under way in Europe is expected to lead to a gradual improvement in the budget balances of the EU countries. Nevertheless, only six of the 15 countries are expected to meet the budget deficit criterion in 1996. The recovery is expected to have less of an effect on countries' performance with respect to the debt criterion. The ratio of debt to GDP is expected to increase through 1996 in most countries.
The criterion limiting the government debt to 60 percent of GDP has been the most difficult for countries to meet. Only Luxembourg has a debt ratio well below' that level, The other three countries that met this criterion in 1994 (France, Germany and the United Kingdom) all have debt-co-GDP ratios close to 50 percent. Among those countries not meeting the criterion, some have debt ratios so high that they would have to run substantial budget surpluses for a number of years to meet it. For example, Buiter, Cosetti and Roubini (1993) rate, Belgium needs a government surplus of more than 9 percent of GDP a year for each year through 1996 to meet the convergence criteria, To meet the criteria by the end of 1998, Belgium would need an annual government surplus greater than 5 percent of
GDP
Sununary-on S'onver~e:nce
To summarize, the data indicate that inflation and interest rate convergence are taking place in the European Union, The outlook for the next two years anticipates further convergence with respect to these two criteria, In contrast, the public finances of the EU members have worsened since the establishment of the convergence criteria. Although the government budget balances of most member states are expected to improve through 1996, the debt ratios are unlikely to show significant improvement. Turning to the exchange rate criterion, five countries are not members of the ERM and thus do not meet, the convergence criterion. For the remaining 10 counties, although the wider bands eliminated tensions within the ERM between August 1993 and March 1995, there is now evidence that even these bands cannot prevent pressure from accumulating on weak currencies.
PROSPECTS ppq~tEMP
For the 1996 inter-governmental conference to set a date for monetary union, eight countries must fulfill all of the convergence criteria. If there are no further devaluations within the ERM, eight countries-Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany Ireland, Luxembourg and the Netherlandswill fulfill the exchange rate criterion in 1996. Thus, if EMU is to get off the ground prior to 1999, all eight of these countries must meet the other four convergence criteria. However, the dehtJGDP ratios of four of these countries-Belgium, Denmark, Ireland and the Netherlands-are not expected to he close to the 60 percent reference value by the end of 1996.
Thus, based on the five convergence criteria, it is almost certain that a majority of the EU countries will not be ready for monetary union when the inter-governmental conference is held in 1996. If EMU is postponed, the next issue is: How many countries will be eligible at the start of 1999, the last possible date for monetary union in accordance with the treaty? Barring unforeseen economic shocks, Germany and Luxembourg should both be eligible for monetary union. respective GDPs. It will be many years before these debt ratios come close to meeting the 60 percent limit, Denmark, Finland, Ireland, the Netherlands and Sweden also have high debt ratios unlikely to fall within the target range by the end of the century The Dutch central bank last year calculated that if the Netherlands limited its annual public sector deficit to percent of GDp, and achieved an average nominal GDP growth of 4 percent a year, it would still rake 10 years to reach the 60 percent public debt target (Financial Times, January 17, 1995) , While 4 percent was the average nominal GDP growth for the Netherlands during 1985-94, its average yearly budget deficit has been more than double 1 percent of GDP over the last 10 years.°P ortugal and Spain are likely to have difficulty meeting several of the criteria. Although they both have substantially lowered their inflation rates in recent years. the 5.1 percent Portuguese and Spanish inflation rates remain outside the ceiling. The debt ratios of both countries also have grown recently and thai of Spain is likely to reunain a problem as long as it maintains its high unemployment rate (estimated at more than 22 percent in 1994). No one expects that Greece will be a candidate for monetary unioti for many years to come, It alone among ahe EU countries still has doubledigit inflation.
The remaining country the United Kingdom, is a good candidate for meeting all of the eligibility requirements for monetary union, except the exchange rate criterion. The United Kingdom is unlikely to rejoin the ERM in the next few years. Even ignoring this problem, opposition to EMU is strong within the British government and Britain is one of two European Union countries that have the right to refuse entry into the monetary union) 0
A change in the government from the ruling Conservative party to the opposition Labour party is likely to increase the prospects for Brirain joining EMU simply because the latter is much more amenable to the idea of monetary union than the former,
Respon.ses to the Lock of Prograss in Meeting the Convergence Criterio
The reality that a majority of countries will not meet the convergence criteria in 1996, and that most, including some keycountries, are unlikely to meet the criteria in 1998, has generated three responses within the European Union. One reaction has been to label the idea of monetary union impractical. A second suggests that the public finance criteria for monetary union can be and should he interpreted with some leeway A third reply suggests that the timetable for monetary union should be interpreted with some flexibility Abandoning EMU l'hose who have reacted to the difficulty in meeting the convergence criteria by labeling EMU impractical are basically opposed to the idea of monetary union, They see the lack of progress in meeting the criteria as a means to gain support for the idea of abandoning the treaty. Proponents of this vieuç most notably some members of the British Parliament, have reacted to each crisis within the ERM with predictions of the deanise of unonetary union. For example, British Prime Minister John Major responded to the August 1993 widening of the bands of the ERM with the statemena that the Maastricht timetable for monetary union was now totally unrealistic." The reaction of Norman 1_amont, the former chancellor of nbc exchequer in Britain, was even more pointed. He claitned that the crisis in the ERM meant 'the end of monetary union in Europe" (Financial Times, August 3, 1993) . In practice, this group supports strict adherence to the convergence criteria, since this will delay the starting date for monetary union,
Flexibility in Interpreting the Convergence Criteria
In opposition to this group are those who not only support EMU hum believe that the earlier the starting date the better, This latter group favors a liberal interpretation of the convergence criteria. One reason for A meducti am i n pmbhc debtcan occur throogh several means besides a government surplus. Bath nominal GOP growth and a reduction i n interest rates an gnvernrnerrt debt will reduce the debt/GOP ratio. Nominal GOP growth way be achieved thrmegh growth in aetynt or iefatian. This might lead are to think thou inflating away nbc debt would bea compelling opine. Such a strategy, hawever, will only work iv the short nun. An increase i n inflator raises the interest none on wInch the government most ban' raw to finance i ts debt, the shorter the maturity of the outstanding debt, the shorten the period of tine before which the engineered irtlla' tiny will olfect the interest rate an the debt. Furtherware, any such attempt by the government to meet the debt convergence cnitenion thnongh inflation i s likely to have lang'term nepenmussians fan the interest rate at which the government bannows by reducing the government's credibility.
ruIn Maasnnicht, the United Kinrgdaw refused to conclude negoniatnas an the treaty aeless i t was given the night ta aptaut at FMU. Denmark is the ether cauntry with the right to apt.oun of maeeuary unlay, It negotoned this nightfallowing the nelectan of a referendum an the treaty. After secetag the opt'out prevision, u new referendum approved the treaty.
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Deing the Maasanicht negotiaions, several countries proposed adaptag a concept of cyclically udlusted deficits. The prapasal was relectad because of measurement problems lfini'Swoghi and others, 19941.
supporting a quick move to monetary union is the belief that a long transition period may itself be the source of instability A proponent of this view is Portes (1993) . In addition to arguing that a long transition period creates instability Portes contends that the convergence criteria are unnecessary because "monetary union will deliver convergence-at least the extent required to maintain it." Dc Grauwe (1994) takes this argument one step further by claiming that the convergence criteria cannot he met prior to EMU. Although support for a quick move to monetaty union is generally tied to the belief that convergence is not a necessary prerequisite for EMU, support for a flexible approach to the criteria is based on addhthonal reasons, One is to provide a wide participation in EMU. Another is the fear among countries that have little chance of meeting the requirements that non-participation in EMU will be costly both politically and economnicafly In the political sphere, countries are afraid that remaining outside EMU will reduce their political power within the EU, particularly as the inner core of countries (the mnembers of EM.U) become more interdependent. In economic terms, countries are concerned that exclusion from EMU may be viewed as a mnark against them, and result in a higher interest rate premiutn and a weakness in their currencies.
Supporters of a flexible approach to the convergence criteria make reference to the Maastricht Treaty to holster their case, 'l'he treaty provides an opening for a relaxation of both the deficit and the debt criteria, The 3 percent deficit/GDP ratio and the 60 percent debtIGDP ratio are referred to in the treaty as reference values, not fixed limits as are the criteria for inflation and interest rates. The treaty says that these reference values must he met unless, in the case of the deficit:
• either the ratio has declined substantially and continuously and reached a level that comes close to the reference value; or
• alternatively the excess over the reference value is only exceptional and temporary and the ratio remains close to the reference value (Treaty on European Union, Article 104c.2.a),
In addition, in preparing its report on whether an excessive deficit exists, the Commission is to take into account:
• whether the government deficit exceeds government investment expenditure (gross fixed capital formation); and
• all other relevant factors, including the medium-term economic and budgetary position of the Member State (Treaty on European Union, Article 104c,3).
These clauses provide the commission a means by which to relax the deficit requirement. As noted by Collignon and others (1994) , the treaty could he interpreted as applying the deficit criteriorn to only the part of the deficit not accounted for by government investment, and only requiring the 3 percent ratio to be met "when the economy was near full capacity" Looking at the data in Table 5 , one could argue that Austria, Denmark and the Netherlands all meet the deficit criterion since their budget deficits remain close to the reference level, and that the elevated levels are merely temporarycaused by the recession,ma With respect to the debt criterion, the Maastricht Treaty states that the reference level (60 percent dehtJGDP) is binding "unless the ratio is sufficiently diminishing and approaching the reference value at a satisfactory pace" (Treaty on European Union, Article 104c.2.b).
'F he debt levels of all the countries, with the exception of Ireland and the Netherlands, have increased between 1990 and 1994, as shown in Table 6 . In Ireland's case, substantial progress has been made in reducing its debt ratio. Ireland has met the deficit convergence criterion in every year and has reduced its debt ratio fromn 97 percent of GDP in 1990 to 90 percent in 1994. In the fall of 1994, the European Council, assessing the progress of countries toward the convergence criteria he treated with flexibility are those who believe that the 1999 deadline should be viewed as flexible. The proponents of a flexible timetable believe that strict adherence to the convergence criteria is a necessary condition for a well-functioning monetary union. Thus, rather than relaxing the criteria to guarantee that an optimal number of countries will participate in EMU, they suggest that the date for monetary union he delayed if the criteria are not met by a sufficient number of countries. German Chancellor Flelmut Kohl was the first leader to publicly address this issne. In 1993, he stated that strict adherence to the convergence criteria might delay mnonetary union beyond 1999.
The October 1993 ruling of the German Constitutional Court supported those who argue that the timetable for monetary union is more flexible than the criteria. The court, in ruling on the constitutionality of the Maastricht Treaty wrote that strict adherence to the convergence criteria was essential to Germany~participation in EMU. In other words, the criteria could not he weakened without the consent of the German parliament.
The German central bank, the Bundesbank, has been perhaps the most vocal advocate of a strict application of the convergence criteria. Both Hans Tietmeyer, the current president of the hank, and his predecessor, Helmut Schlesinger, have made statements on several occasions favoring a strict interpretation of the Maastricht criteria while claiming that the criteria are themselves not strict enough. For example, the Bundesbank has favored an absolute limit on inflation rather than a relative one, the latter based on the behavior of other countries. The reason for this is to ensure not simply convergence in inflation rates, but also a commitment to price stability The Bundesbank has also attacked the deficit criterion as setting too high a ceiling. Specifically Mr. Tietmeyer has stated that the ceiling for the deficit ratio is at least double what it should be. He also has emphasized that the deficit criterion should be met throughout the business cycle (Financial Times, November 5, 1994) '~This statement contrasts with a study prepared for the European Parliament that suggests that "It would be keeping~ch the spirit of the Treaty, if 3 percent were taken as the 'full employment' deficit during periods of economic expansion" (Collignon and others, 1994, p. 76 ).
As noted above, the emphasis on a strict interpretation of the convergence criteria is based on the belief that adherence to them is necessary for a well-functioning monetamy union. The proponents of strict criteria argue that for EMU to succeed, the member states must show a prior commitment to price stability and follow sound government budgetary policies. Specifically the emphasis on a strict interpretation of the deficit criterion is based on the idea that "a sound budget position is an indispensable precondition for a successful anti-inflationary monetary policy~HThere is a concern that within a monetary union, expansionary national fiscal policies (as evidenced by budget deficits in excess of 3 percent of GDP) could conflict with the monetary policy of the supranational central bank. Such a conflict would not only create difficulties for the central bank in its effort to maintain price stability but also could cause tension among the participants in the monetary union. Would the participants of a monetary union be willing to accept a recession brought about by the anti-inflationary polices of the central bank in an effort to combat the fiscal laxity of other members? Furthermore, although the Maastricht Treaty prohibits the central hank from extending credit to, or directly purchasing the debt of, member 
ONCLUSION
Despite the many setbacks that have occurred since the December 1991 conclusion of the Maastricht Treaty most of the countries of the European Union remain committed to monetary union. This commitment, however, has not been enough to produce the economic convergence prescribed by the treaty Many countries have made progress in reducing their inflation rates, and the divergence in long-term nominal interest rates is declining. On the fiscal side, however, the number of countries meeting the convergence criteria has declined. The recent recession in Europe resulted in a deterioration in the fiscal balances of most countries. In addition, the 1992-93 exchange rate crises resulted in a reduction in the membership of the ERM. Thus, the European Union is further away from a fulfillment of the convergence criteria today than it was in the year prior to the negotiation of the Maastricht Treaty By the end of 1996, the member states of the European Union must decide if a majority of countries are ready to proceed to EMU in 1997. As detailed above, it is implausible that a majority of countries will have fulfilled the convergence criteria by the end of 1996. EMU will most certainly he delayed beyond its earliest possible starting date. The Maastricht Treaty states that the final stage of EMU must begin by,January 1, 1999, with the membership decided by July 1998, Even by this date, few countries are hkely to satisfy the convergence criteria.
Given the lack of progress in meeting the convergence criteria, the European Union faces two options if it is to continue to pursue EMU: Relax the criteria or relax the Others have claimed that even a aevernmeet then has e hrlanced budget during upnurns cauld have a budgetdeficit eeceediag the Maestricht limitdurina a recession. See, for example, Eicheegreer (1992) cod Keneo (1992) . fichengreen argues that it may ever he optimal far disciplined guy' erenrents to accasiorrlty have deficits exceeding 3 percent of GOt (p. 50).
lietreeyem (September 9, 1994) .
H Supportfor this view is giuer by
Frotarri, voe Hageo end Wailer (1992) and Cmig (19941.
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